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Empirical evidence shows that acting on early warnings can help humanitarian organizations reduce losses, damages and suffering while reducing costs. Available
forecasts of extreme events can provide the information required to automatically trigger preparedness measures, while ‘value of information’ approaches can, in
principle, guide the selection of forecast thresholds that make early action preferable to inaction.
We acknowledge here that, for real-world humanitarian situations, the value of information approach accurately estimates the value of forecasts only if key factors
relevant for the humanitarian sector are taken into account. First, the negative consequences of acting in vain are significant and must be factored in. Secondly, the
“most valuable” forecast thresholds depend on criteria beyond expenses reduction, and this choice must be explicitly considered in funding mechanisms for early
warning products and services. Two options to guide this selection are examined: a maximizing criterion for cost effectiveness, and a satisficing criterion for loss
avoidance. Third, decision-makers must be able to confidently assess whether the forecast threshold they are selecting is robust to all possible cost/loss structures for
the action in question.
Based on these considerations, we explore the application of the valuation approach to select which forecasts (magnitude, probability and lead time) should trigger
humanitarian actions. Using a basic example of ensemble precipitation forecast to prepare for potential floods, we discuss how the valuation approach can be used to
select probability thresholds that trigger early action, and some of the generalisations required to make this applicable to a wider range of humanitarian situations.1. Introduction
Extreme events lead to disasters only when they hit exposed,
vulnerable people and assets and no timely measures are taken to avoid
damages and losses. Empirical evidence shows that acting on early
warnings can help humanitarian organizations to achieve their aims of
reducing suffering and, at the same time, reduce costs. For example, early
action based on seasonal forecasts of unusually wet conditions in West
Africa allowed regional and local Red Cross workers to implement flood
preparedness measures, from evacuation plans at the community level to
prepositioning relief items - resulting in flood response that was weeks
faster and substantially cheaper than in other similar occasions when no
early action was taken (Braman, 2013). Based on evaluations post
disaster, some authors have argued that early humanitarian action can be
far more effective than late disaster response after the extreme event has* Corresponding author. PO Box 28120, 2502 KC, The Hague, The Netherlands.
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action followed by no extreme event. (Cabot Venton, 2012; Oenone
Chadburn, 2013; Webster et al., 2010; Knowlton et al., 2014).
However, for many humanitarian organizations, implementing pre-
ventive actions in response to a forecast is usually not possible, as
financing mechanisms are available only during and after an extreme
event (i.e. emergency appeals for disaster response and reconstruction)
or for measures not linked to actual extreme events occurring (i.e. annual
appeals for general disaster risk reduction) (Suarez, 2009; Hillbruner and
Moloney, 2012).
As a way to overcome this limitation, the idea of forecast based
financing (FbF) for disaster preparedness is being trialled in a series of
pilot studies in different countries. The FbF approach aims to pre-agree
on early humanitarian actions, science based triggers and earmarked
funding before the early warning is issued (Coughlan de Perez et al.,he CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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when the forecast trigger arrives; ensuring action is taken before a po-
tential extreme event. While in traditional humanitarian interventions,
the response and disbursement of funds are done once the disaster has
occurred; the goal of early actions based on forecasts is to respond before
the potential event using hydro-meteorological forecasts.
The FbF approach is currently being piloted in Peru, Mozambique,
Bangladesh and 12 other countries around the world.1 In five of these
countries (Guatemala, Niger, Sudan, Philippines and Zimbabwe), the
World Food Programme developed a FbFmechanism as part of their Food
Security Climate Resilience Facility (FoodSECuRE) ,2 which is a financial
and programmatic tool that uses seasonal climate forecasts to trigger
actions for community resilience-building and for preparedness to reduce
the impacts of climate disasters before they occur. Climate variability is
one of its key drivers of food and nutrition security in vulnerable regions
around the world, and the ability to anticipate extreme events before
they happen can help avoid food insecurity at the household level.
To implement the FbF approach, given a forecast of the hydro-
meteorological extreme event that could cause a disaster, the humani-
tarian worker must select the forecast attributes that should trigger her
actions. These include the lead time, the minimum magnitude of the
extreme event that causes damage (hereafter “danger level”), and for
ensemble forecasts, the forecast probability threshold (hereafter
“trigger”).
Forecasters have developed a “value of information” approach
whereby user actions and associated avoidable losses are introduced, and
forecasts are evaluated in terms of their potential to reduce expected
losses, as opposed to evaluating them uniquely in terms of forecast skill
(see for instance Murphy et al. (1985), Mylne (2002), Katz and Murphy
(1997), Jolliffe and Stephenson (2003)). From the point of view of the
forecaster, this approach is useful to assign value to the forecasting sys-
tem. In reality, such valuation statistics are rarely (if ever) 3 used to
trigger action in the humanitarian sector, in part because some of the
assumptions of the approach do not hold. Firstly, the current prevailing
humanitarian model is simply to not act on the forecast but act after the
extreme event,4 affording the losses when the disaster has already
occurred. Moreover, traditional forecast valuation techniques assume
that the decision-maker will minimize the average expense when acting
on a forecast, calculated over a series of events and actions. However,
when assessing “value” in the context of disaster risk reduction, criteria
beyond optimising expenses are decidedly relevant. Finally, the potential
consequences of “acting in vain” are an important part of the valuation of
the forecast for the humanitarian actor. The forecast valuation approach
usually assumes the cost of early action to be constant whether or not the
extreme event occurs5; whereas humanitarian organizations see the
consequences of actions “in vain” as different in nature than the cost of
“worthy actions” (Coughlan de Perez et al., 2014, 2015).





3 To our knowledge, there are no reports of real-world humanitarian action
triggered by a probabilistic forecast based on thresholds determined by the
‘value of information’.
4 With the exception of tropical cyclone forecasts and some resilience pro-
grammes aimed at reducing the baseline risk, the default for the humanitarian
user is not to act.
5 The false alarm or ‘cry-wolf’ effect has been taken into account through, for
instance the incorporation of the users' rate of compliance in the valuation
approach (Roulston and Smith (2004)). Roulston et al. show that adopting a
probabilistic approach to forecasting avoids making implicit assumptions about
users' attitudes towards false alarms. Furthermore, communicating the forecast
uncertainty improves weather related decisions (Joslyn and LeClerc (2012)).
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context of humanitarian interventions, in this work we identify the at-
tributes of the forecasts that can support a forecast based approach to
financing disaster preparedness and propose an analytical framework for
decision criteria, establishing thresholds linking early warning informa-
tion to early humanitarian action.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic
elements required to support forecast based financing of disasters, e.g.,
early actions, early warnings and the decision criteria to trigger actions.
In section 3 we describe the methodology to identify the forecasts attri-
butes to trigger action, and in section 4 we illustrate this approach with
precipitation forecasts for flood preparedness in Peru. Section 5 is
devoted to the discussion.
2. Early warnings for forecast based financing
When implementing the forecast based approach to financing disaster
preparedness, the humanitarian actor has to consider three key elements:
(1) the set of early actions (or action plan) to be triggered by the fore-
casts, and whose aim is to avoid losses and damages if extreme event
materialises, (2) the early warning information derived from forecasts
that triggers the early actions, and (3) the decision criteria chosen to
define whether or not it is worthwhile to act based on the available in-
formation. It is helpful to discuss the main properties of each of these
elements with some detail.
(1) Action is motion with purpose. In terms of the early actions
worth considering prior to an extreme event, the humanitarian
actor should select a menu of pre-determined actions to be trig-
gered by different forecasts of the extreme event at different lead-
time. For each of the actions, she needs to estimate, the time
required for implementation, how long the action will last, and the
cost of taking the action. This includes the cost of acting in vain if
no extreme event materialises.
Clearly some of these parameters are not static; for instance the cost of
acting in vain might increase over time if the forecasting system has
several false alarms in a row. Moreover, estimating some of these
parameters is not trivial, particularly when the decisions to act
depend on collaboration of individuals and organizations, such as
voluntary evacuation.
(2) The early warning information can be provided by (skilful)
numerical weather model forecasts, or combinations of these
models' output and statistical models (some times useful to
improve skill or to interpret model output for the location of in-
terest (see for instance Webster et al. (2010))). The lead time and
spatial scale of the forecasts has to match the lead time and spatial
reach of the actions.
For some events such as slow onset flooding, an impacts model that
translates the meteorological information (extreme precipitation)
into the impacts variable (inundation area) will be necessary to issue
a flood forecast.
In some cases an (observed) “index” to trigger action could be more
appropriate than a forecast. For instance, observed rainfall deficits
that precede crop failure could be used to trigger actions to prevent
drought losses .6
(3) Lastly, a forecast-based financing system requires a decision
criteria to select the forecast probability or trigger that will6 This approach requires robustly quantifying the relationship between the
observed index and the hazard occurrence. In drought-prone regions it has been
used to implement index-based insurance (see for instance African Risk Ca-
pacity: http://www.africanriskcapacity.org/documents/350251/371107/ARC_
Overview_Brief_EN.pdf, and Suarez and Linnerooth-Bayer (2011)). Note how-
ever that while the aim of index based insurance is to compensate for losses and
damages after the hazard, FbF intends to take preventative actions to avoid the
losses and damages.
Fig. 1. Summary of the information supporting the forecast based financing
approach. The yellow boxes represent the three components: actions, forecasts
and decision criteria. The orange boxes include information that combines two
or more of these components. For instance, event threshold or danger level is
common to the forecasts and the actions in that a forecast of a particular danger
level will trigger actions that protect if the danger level is overcome. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
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question faced by the humanitarian actor with a specific budget is
the following. Should she act given any arbitrary forecast proba-
bility of an extreme event? This will of course cost a lot of money,
but ensure that the region under her watch will have very few
damages and losses if the extreme event materialises. Alterna-
tively, should she use the forecasts to try to economise on
spending, and only act on the forecasts that ensure a better chance
of preventing disasters?
Two methods, each representing different priorities relevant to the
humanitarian sector, could be used to address these questions – these
represent a divergence from the assumptions of value maximization
inherent in traditional value of information approaches.
Prevented event maximization: For a given early action, the human-
itarian actor selects the forecast thresholds or triggers in such a way that
the maximum possible number of extreme events is preceded by the
preventive action, under the constraint that expenses incurred by trig-
gering this action are not larger than expected expenses and losses
assuming no early action. This is a satisficing approach, more appropriate
for organizations with a fixed budget for a specific location; they would
use the same amount (or less) of funding for pre-disaster preparedness
measures as would have been spent for post-disaster relief measures, but
would drastically reduce the avoidable losses in the target area.
Expense minimization: For a given early action, the humanitarian
actor selects the forecast thresholds or triggers that minimize expected
expenses relative to the expected losses post-disaster that could be avoided
if the preventative action is implemented. This is a maximization
approach, potentially relevant for organizations that are trying to reach
the largest geographical coverage possible; they would use this method to
minimize expenses for a specific location and then spend the available
budget on as many locations as could be covered – or on actions other
than disaster preparedness.
The early actions, early warning information and decision criteria
described above are all required to develop approaches that aim to use
meteorological forecasts of extreme events to trigger actions that could
prevent a disaster. The risk of disaster however, results as a combination
of the probability of the hazard or extreme event, and the exposure and
vulnerability of the population at risk. Therefore the use of meteoro-
logical forecasts to trigger early action assumes that when the extreme
event occurs, the impacts are high enough to cause a disaster. This re-
quires the determination of the event threshold or danger level, i.e., the
magnitude and persistence of the hydro-meteorological event that is
linked to the occurrence of avoidable and unavoidable losses and dam-
ages (which, if large, leads to disaster).
Based on the experience of public weather services and some hu-
manitarian organizations, the determination of the danger levels can be
done in several ways depending on the availability of data:
 Using empirical evidence linking hydrometeorology with disaster.
For heat waves for instance, the temperature threshold for an
increased risk of morbidity and mortality can be determined based on
epidemiological studies (Kovats and Hajat, 2007; Ebi et al., 2004;
Public Health England, 2015), or through surveys in the populations
at risk (Knowlton et al., 2014).
 Based on how frequently the decision maker is willing or able to act.
For instance, cold weather alerts could be issued based on the number
of alerts that health and social services are able to act upon during the
winter (Public Health England, 2014)
 Combining observational data and listings of historical disasters
sourced from databases such as EM-DAT (http://www.emdat.be) and
media outlets, to identify the magnitude of extreme meteorological
events that preceded disasters (and did not occur very frequently with
no disaster following) (Coughlan de Perez et al. (2016)). In this case,
care has to be taken to develop reliable damage functions, especially3
when combining databases, since these could be based on different
impact assessment methods used at country level.
 Combining the experience of local community members and the
expertise of the local hydro-meteorological services to identify critical
thresholds of meteorological events that have led to local impacts in
the past (Han et al., 2010). This is not different from the construction
of disaster profiles based on expert panel discussions and insights
provided by customers, a common approach in places where weather
alerts and warnings are standard part of the meteorological services
(Ambhul, 2010).
In the FbF pilots currently being developed around the world, danger
levels describe the hydro-meteorological conditions that cause impact on
the people living in a particular area. To formulate danger levels, con-
versations are held between technical and scientific entities, community
representatives, government actors, and local non-governmental entities
to determine what weather or climate conditions have caused impact in
the past. These levels are validated through a field study in some com-
munities, to ensure that the actions are adapted to the local context, as
the danger level will vary across regions. Danger levels can be expressed
as a return period of the event, related to how frequently the humani-
tarian actor would like to take preparatory action. This can be a political
decision, also dependent on the funding availability for action.
In the FoodSEcurRE pilots, the WFP together with the International
Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) has worked to identify
the climate shocks that tend to impact on food security. Indicators such as
the number of wet days in a season that are needed to grow crops define
the danger level. When this danger level is forecasted to be reached, and
taking into account background information such as other non climatic
factors that impact on food security, disaster managers can take action,
well before the crops have failed and food security has declined. For
example, when planning interventions related to an El Ni~no event that
potentially increases the likelihood of drought in a given region, the WFP
might call a high level meeting at the first sign of the event. When the
event is confirmed, a drought forecast and monitoring plan might be
developed and agricultural extension officers contacted. If the forecast
confidence increases and dry conditions start to appear the WFPwill then
access the FbF fund to prepare for food crisis interventions.
Fig. 1 summarizes the three pieces of information required to support
FbF of disasters: actions, forecasts and decision criteria, and their linksreferred to the Web version of this article.)
Table 1
Contingency table summarizing the number of instances when each of the four
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3. Choosing the triggers for action
While the extreme event magnitude that causes impact can be
determined a priori, the trigger or forecast probability threshold that
should be used to trigger an action depends on the action itself.
There are three prerequisites to the application of the simple valua-
tion approach:
First, the meteorological or hydrological conditions that lead to
avoidable losses are well defined (thus the work to identify the danger
level has already been done), and an early action is available. Given the
meteorological parameter that has the potential to cause the disaster (for
instance the accumulated precipitation, or the river discharge defined by
both a magnitude and a duration or time scale), we can then define that
the (binary) event occurs when the meteorological variable (Q) is above
its danger level or critical value (Qcrit), and it does not occur otherwise.
Second, we assume that the forecast-based financing system will
automatically trigger action when the forecast probability of exceeding
Qcrit is larger than a trigger pth; no action is taken otherwise.
To optimally determine the trigger, information about the past per-
formance of the forecast system is required. So the third prerequisite is
that a set of forecasts and the corresponding observations (or verifica-
tions) for the meteorological event of interest is available. In the case of
pluvial floods for instance, this will entail the precipitation forecasts of
the extreme event and their corresponding verifications over a period of
time long enough to be of climatological relevance. This might be a
problem in places where the observational records are short or incom-
plete, or when using new forecasting systems that do not have long
enough reforecasts (Coughlan de Perez et al., 2016).
Given the set of forecasts and verification pairs over a period with n
discrete event intervals (i.e., days over a series of rainy seasons), they can
be summarized in a contingency table as follows.
In this table n¼ a þ b þ c þ d is the total number of forecast-
observation pairs (for instance the number of days in the record for
daily precipitation forecasts). The sample estimate of the climatological
probability of the extreme event is s¼ (a þ c)/n. The variables a, b, and c
will take different values when different triggers pth are chosen, and can
be used to define two key parameters: the Hit Rate and the False Alarm
Ratio.
Hit Rate: H ¼ a/(aþc). H is the sample estimate of the likelihood that
an early actionwas triggered given that the event occurred, and estimates
the fraction of prevented disasters (i.e. humanitarian measures imple-
mented, losses avoided).
False Alarm Ratio: FAR¼ b/(a þ b). FAR is the sample estimate of the
probability of the event not happening given that the forecast probability
p exceeded pth and the early action was triggered. FAR estimates the
fraction of early actions that would end up being in vain.
These statistics assume that the benefit of an early action does not out-
live the duration of the disaster, consequently every time there is a new
warning the action will be triggered again. That is clearly not the case for
actions that last longer than any individual disaster. For instance, in the
case of a village prone to become isolated by pluvial floods, water or food
storage units deployed just before an extreme precipitation forecast, will
be in use for much longer than that individual flood. The generalization
of this approach for long lived actions is discussed in the Supplementary
Information (SI).
In order to establish what forecast probability threshold or triggers
should trigger early action, the disaster manager (DM) should consider
the expenses (i.e. costs and losses) associated with taking or not a
particular early action based on an early warning. These are.
- If the early warning is issued and the disaster occurs, for any partic-
ular action the total cost for the DM will be the sum of the cost of4
acting C, and the unavoidable losses Lua (losses that cannot be
reduced by the action taken, such as crop loss due to inundation).
- If the early warning is issued and the disaster does not happen, then
the cost for the DM is C plus any additional cost of acting in vain Cav.
The difference between C and Cav is that the former is a cost incurred
regardless of whether the action proves worthy or in vain, while Cav is
incurred only if the extreme event does not materialize after taking
early action. For example, the additional cost of transporting back to
headquarters non perishable food that had been prepositioned, would
be an additional cost of acting in vain that would not have been
incurred if the extreme event had occurred. However, Cav could be
negative, if for instance stocks that had been purchased are sold to
recuperate some of their value if the extreme event did not occur.
- If the extreme event is not forecast but it does happen, the cost is the
sum of the avoidable and the unavoidable losses, L¼ La þ Lua. Note
that La are the avoidable losses for the particular action (or actions)
for which the cost is C. These include the savings in potentially more
costly responsive actions after the disaster if no preventive action was
taken, and also the losses that will not be incurred by the disaster-
impacted population had the action been taken.
- If the event is not forecast and the disaster does not happen, there is
no cost to the DM.
This information is summarized in Table 2.
By multiplying the entries in Table 1 (expressed as the fraction of
times the early action is taken (or not) according to the issuing (or not) of
the early warning) by the entries in Table 2 (i.e., the costs and losses
associated with taking or not taking early action), the expected value of the
expense incurredwhen linking early warning and early action based on the
trigger pth, EEW can be derived:
EEW ¼ an ðC þ LvaÞ þ
b
n
ðC þ LavÞ þ cn L (1)
When writing this expression, we are assuming that the early actions
triggered by the early warning are not correlated in time (or space); and
that expenses can be averaged over a large sample (space and/or time)
implicitly assuming that actions are equally effective every time they are
taken, and their cost loss structure does not change. In some cases this
might not be true, for example if over a given season the cost of taking the
action a second time is smaller than when taking it for the first time.
These limitations can be addressed by applying generalisations of the
simple valuation approach such as sequential decision making (Katz and
Murphy, 1997; Murphy et al., 1985).
To evaluate the potential savings when using the early warning, EEW
has to be compared with the expected expenses in the absence of an early
warning: Eno_EW¼ sL (i.e. the sample estimate of the climatological
Table 2
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unavoidable losses).
Taking early action based on the early warning is worthwhile if the
expected value of the expenses is reduced, i.e., if Eno_EW-EEW >0.7
A useful metric to evaluate the effectiveness of the early warning
based action is the relative expense reduction 0 < Vrel < 1, that expresses
the saved expenses relative to the expenses incurred when not using an
early warning. Using the expressions for a,b and c in terms of H and FAR,
we can write












The larger Vrel the larger the proportion of Eno_EW saved, or equiva-
lently, the smaller the expenses EEW that mitigate the loss La. It is clear
that Vrel> 0whenever the bracket in equation (2) is positive, and this is a
necessary condition for acting on the forecast (otherwise it would be
cheaper not to act). While the condition for Vrel being positive only de-
pends on FAR, the maximum value of Vrel, i.e. the minimum expense for
acting on the forecast for a particular action, depends on H and is ach-
ieved for smaller FAR.
If the DM knows the cost-loss structure of the actions (Table 2), and
has the forecast-verification statistics to build the contingency table
(Table 1), then she can use either the expense minimization or the pre-
vented events maximization method to choose the optimal trigger p*th.
The resulting system would state that, whenever a forecast of pre-
cipitation, or river discharge exceeding Qcrit is issued with a probability p
larger than the optimal threshold or trigger p*th, the DM should take
preventive early action.How does the decision process work in a generic case?
Whether or not the inequality Eno EW  EEW> 0 is satisfied depends
on the action through the cost and loss values in Table 2; and on the
choice of trigger pth through the values of a,b,c,d in Table 1 (or equiva-
lently the values of H, FAR). Therefore, by varying the probability
threshold (or equivalently varying a,b,c,d) it is possible to find the
optimal value of the trigger p*th for which the inequality holds for a given
action (or cost-loss structure). For those cases (if they exist), the DM can
systematically reduce her expected expenses if she takes early action
whenever the forecast probability is equal or larger than p*th. Fig. 2
displays the information needed to choose this optimal threshold or
trigger.
For expense minimization, the DM aims to make Vrel as large as
possible (red in the diagram), thus reducing the expected expenses when
acting on the early warning. She will search for triggers that are closer to
red in the underlying colour shading. Following this method the DM will
choose p*th¼ p2.7 Equation (1) and this inequality assume that cost and losses can be mone-
tised and all the terms in the equations are commensurable. This might be
problematic if for a particular decision maker, the losses involve only life lost,
whereas costs are only monetary (the funding needed to save that life with an
early action triggered by the early warning). This can lead to the potentially
unacceptable need of establishing a monetary value for a statistical life.
5
For event maximization (highest possible number of extreme events is
preceded by the preventive early action), the DM aims to maximize the
Hit Rate H under the constraint that Vrel> 0. She will then select triggers
located as high as possible on the vertical, but with a valid background
colour (Vrel> 0). In this case the DM will choose p*th¼ p1.
Given a probabilistic forecast and its forecast-verification statistics, a
Disaster Manager can use the contingency table to calculate the values of
H and FAR for different forecast probabilities and plot them in the figure.
These are indicated as p1, p2, and p3 with p1 the smallest and p3 the
largest value. The grey shading represents an estimate of the sampling
error in the determination of H and FAR for each trigger.
Reducing the value of the danger level Qcrit or the lead time, and/or
increasing the skill of the forecasting system will in general decrease FAR
and increase H, therefore moving the position of p1, p2, and p3 towards
the top left corner of the figure, where Vrel is larger.
Lower triggers have larger values of H and FAR (p1), while larger
triggers have smaller H and FAR (p3).
4. Choosing triggers for action for flood preparation in Peru
In the previous section, we used a generic example (Fig. 2) to illus-
trate how the forecast trigger can be defined based on the value of in-
formation approach. In this section we concentrate on one of the
Forecast-based Financing pilot projects currently being implemented by
the Peruvian Red Cross.8 This pilot aims to implement preventative ac-
tions to reduce losses and damages associated with floods in the North
West of Perú.
In this region, the rainy season extends between January and April
(Bazo, 2013), and pluvial and fluvial floods are particularly severe during
El Ni~no events (Lagos et al., 2008). Peru was seriously affected during the
last two extraordinary El Ni~no in 1982-83 and 1997-98, when the
country's economic losses amounted to 4.5% of the GDP (CAF, 2001). In
particular, the losses in the agricultural sector reached 612 millions of
dollars (17% of the total losses). Food production was negatively affected
by the inundation of arable land, the destruction of irrigation infra-
structure due to extreme precipitation, floods and landslides, and the
proliferation of pests in rice and maize (CAF, 2001).
Since October 2015, the Peruvian and German Red Cross have been
collaborating to develop the early warnings products required to support
the implementation of preventative actions in anticipation of extreme
precipitation and floods linked with the possibility of a strong coastal El
Ni~no event. Data from previous events show that, at the community level,
a strong El Ni~no has a great impact on health, drinking water, food se-
curity and housing.9
Early action protocols have been developed that include actions to be
triggered by a series of different lead times forecasts. The selection of
actions was based on the needs identified in the vulnerable communities
and the availability of adequate forecast products. Some of the forecasts
that are being considered include sea surface temperature forecasts over
the El Ni~no 1 þ 2 region 2 or 3 months out, monthly precipitation
forecasts, and medium range precipitation and river discharge forecasts.
The actions include volunteer training, awareness campaigns, the pur-
chase and supply of relief items for safe drinking water, training to
improve health and hygiene, and strengthening of houses.
For our illustration, the forecast information was obtained from the
ECMWF medium range ensemble forecasting system of daily total accu-
mulated precipitation (Molteni, 1996). We focus the analysis on the re-
gions of Piura and Lambayeque in NorthWest Peru, and pool together the
rainy seasons (January to April) of a series of consecutive years8 The project is supported technically by the German Red Cross and the Red




Fig. 2. For a given early action (with associated, fixed values of C/La and Cav/La), the relative cost gain Vrel that can be obtained by linking actions to forecasts is a
function of the proportion of actions in vain (FAR, in the horizontal) and proportion of worthy actions (H, in the vertical). The possible values of Vrel are represented by
the background colour shading (with indicated legend), with white shading indicating Vrel <0 for high FAR values. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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relevant. We consider consecutive years to ensure as far as possible that
the skill of the forecasting system is similar from year to year.
In order to build the statistics depicted in Table 1 for different choices
of the probability threshold pth, we use as verification the station data
provided by the Peruvian National Meteorological Service (SENHAMI)
and compare it with the nearest grid point in the ECMWF forecasting
model.
Fig. 3 illustrates the selection of triggers for the extreme precipitation
forecast for Chulucanas, a station situated in one of two regions chosen to
intervene. We show the results for the 7-day lead-time forecasts for the
85% extreme event, i.e., when the danger level corresponds to daily
precipitation exceeding the 85% percentile of the climatological distri-
bution for the region. The dependence of the valuation of the early
warning information on choosing alternative danger levels or forecast
lead-time is discussed in the SI.
To estimate the sampling uncertainty of the values of H and FAR and
their resulting Vrel (for each particular action), we use a bootstrapping
resampling approach (Jollife, 2007). This uncertainty might be signifi-
cant in situations where the records available to compute the statistics
are short; in these cases there might not be enough information to
identify the optimal trigger.
Approaches to measure avoidable and unavoidable losses, as well as
quantifiable and unquantifiable losses, are being developed by the FbF
pilot projects to advance the understanding of early actions. This includes
traditional quantitative cost-benefit studies as well as more qualitative
discussions of costs and benefits within a project team. In particular, the
estimation of the cost-loss structure of the preventative actions included
in the protocols developed by the Peruvian Red Cross is work under
progress. Therefore, for illustrative purposes and to test the sensitivity of
the triggers to the cost-loss structure of the actions, we choose a range of
values of C/La (0.03 and 0.3).6
Fig. 3 shows the information required to select the optimal triggers for
the Chulucanas forecast. It is clear when comparing the different panels
that the inclusion of a cost of “acting in vain” will affect the trigger
selected for action. For an action whose cost is about 3% of the avoidable
losses (C/La¼ 0.03 in the top panels) minimization of expenses (or
maximization of Vrel) leads to choosing p*th¼ 10% when the cost of
acting in vain is negligible (Cav/La¼ 0 in the top left panel), or p*th¼ 30%
if the cost of acting in vain is 30% of the avoidable losses (Cav/La¼ 0.3 in
the top right panel). A higher trigger in the later case makes sense, since
increasing the cost of acting in vain increases the expenses of acting more
often (and then risking acting in vain). On the other hand, if the DM aims
to achieve as many worthy actions as possible without overspending, in
both cases she will choose p*th¼ 10% which corresponds to the largest
number of worthy actions. However, for negligible cost of acting in vain
(Cav/La¼ 0) the relative reduction in expenses is 70% (top left panel)
while the relative reduction in expenses for Cav/La¼ 0.3 is just 30% (top
right panel). This must be considered when estimating the number of
times the DM can act in vain without negative consequences.
When the cost of action increases relative to the avoidable losses
(bottom panels), the potential reduction in expenses Vrel decreases
(darker colour shading in both panels). Moreover, it becomes negative
for some choices of trigger, such as for p*th¼ 10% in the bottom right
pane, eliminating the possibility of choosing the lower trigger. As ex-
pected, the larger the relative costs, the larger the trigger required for the
expenses to be reduced when acting on the forecast.
Vrel is shown, as in Fig. 2, as a function of H and FAR for the cost-loss
structure indicated in each panel. Notice that the cost of acting in vain
increases from the left to right in each row of panels, and the cost of the
action increasing from top to bottom in each column.
Given the probabilistic forecast of extreme precipitation (Qcrit¼ 85%
event), the values of H and FAR are computed for triggers 10%, 30%, and
50% and indicated in each of the panels, with the surrounding grey
Fig. 3. Decision process for the 7-day lead time precipitation forecasts at Chulucanas.
A. Lopez et al. Weather and Climate Extremes xxx (2017) 1–8markers representing the sampling uncertainty. Note that the probabi-
listic forecast is the same in all panels; so the position of the grey symbols
indicating sampling uncertainty remains the same.
5. Discussion
In this work we adapted existing valuation approaches to illustrate
how probabilistic weather forecasts can be selected to trigger an action
for FbF of disasters. Given a specific early action, we described an
approach to identify under which circumstances it is valuable to trigger it
(if at all) with the forecast product under consideration, and discussed
assumptions and trade-offs when selecting thresholds for action (and
limitations of the approach).
Our work suggests the following best practices:
Forecast value must be determined in collaboration with actors
Skilful forecasts of hydro meteorological events per se are not
necessarily valuable to humanitarians. An understanding of extreme
events that cause impact (danger level) and the associated early actions
that can help avoid losses and damages is required. In order to under-
stand the value of specific early warning thresholds, local meteorological
services should work with disaster responders and local communities to
identify the characteristics of the hazards and the humanitarian decision
challenges. For instance, as we illustrated in the flooding example, add-
ing the cost of acting in vain can dramatically change the choice of
triggers or forecast thresholds that have the most value; in one case,
considering the cost of acting in vain cause the once-optimal warning
trigger to have negative value. Collaborating to identify possible early
actions is critical to define appropriate action triggers in early warnings.7
Collaboration between development and humanitarian donors
Depending on the desired impact of the funding invested, actors will
select different decision-rules, which substantially impacts the choice of
p*th. Donors wishing to support the establishment of an early warnings
for FbF need to consider the merits of investing a specific amount of
funding in a specific location (minimize suffering in that location by
spending all the funding available) or maximizing the effectiveness of
their work bymaximizing Vrel and acting in as many locations as possible.
While this assumes that a single investor is considering the costs of
early action and the costs of response from a single budgetary standpoint,
in reality this is rarely the case, as investments often originate from
different entities. The proposed approach enables transparency in as-
sumptions and priorities, thus encouraging greater strategic collabora-
tion between the two sides.
Too many instances of acting in vain can lead to ‘crying wolf’ per-
ceptions, desensitizing people and organizations to take action based on
early warnings. However, if FAR is large and at the same time Vrel is large
for actions with a low cost-loss ratio, then those actions could be incor-
porated into a basic preparedness plan that could be put in place before
the floods or heat wave season for instance. Securing funding for this type
of plans could guarantee long term commitment to DRR as well as to
blending DRRmeasures into development strategies (Glantz et al., 2013).
It is also up to humanitarian policies to select between the expense
minimization and event maximization criteria described above. As
illustrated in this paper, the optimal trigger depends on this choice, and
there are a number of options in between that all have some sort of value.Valuation as one of many criteria for developing early warnings
The valuation approach for the selection of thresholds to trigger
A. Lopez et al. Weather and Climate Extremes xxx (2017) 1–8preventative actions assumes that the cost and losses for each preventa-
tive action can be quantified. In real situations this can be a barrier since
a wide range of cost-loss ratios can be obtained depending on the un-
derlying assumptions. At the same time, changing the cost-loss ratio can
change the optimal forecast threshold for action. Therefore decision-
makers will need to be confident that – for the range of cost-loss ratios
that could possibly apply to their action, they are picking a trigger that is
robust (will have value in all/most of the cases) (Lempert et al., 2006). In
the above analysis, increasing the cost/loss ratio by a factor of 10 still
resulted in options for a “valuable” trigger.
As shown, the valuation approach allows for some flexibility in the
choice of forecast attributes and allows for some margin of error in the
choice of triggers.
However, the valuation, or economic case, for the selection of
thresholds for a forecast-based financing early warning is a key compo-
nent, but not the only necessary consideration. Even though humani-
tarian organizations have to work under the constraints of a finite
budget, considerations other than minimization of expenses must be
taken into account. While equations (1) and (2) assume that cost and
losses can be monetised and all the terms in the equations are
commensurable, in the humanitarian context losses and costs are likely to
be incommensurable (e.g. money for C, lives lost for L, reputational
damage for Cav). In this case, and/or when the cost-loss data is not
available, the humanitarians will select the triggers using qualitative
approaches that take into consideration their subjective situation,
including institutional constraints and reputational risks, by addressing
questions such as how often do they feel comfortable with taking FbF
action, how many times they can access FbF funding, what are the non-
climatic factors that contribute to the risk of impacts, etc.
There is some evidence suggesting that disaster risk reduction en-
hances the potential for communities to develop by for instance reducing
the negative impacts of disasters on economic growth (Mochizuki et al.,
2014). Developing a FbF mechanism (Coughlan de Perez, 2014) that,
based on early warnings, provides the institutional and funding ar-
rangements that allow humanitarian actors to carry out pre disaster ac-
tivities to reduce potential losses and damages, effectively bridges the
humanitarian and the development sectors. The valuation approach
detailed here can be used in collaborations between forecasters and hu-
manitarians to establish such a mechanism, contributing to effectively
bridge this gap.
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